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DIALOGUE 
 
Cognitive Processes Shaped by the 
Impulse to Blame 
Joshua Knobe† 
In his incisive and thought-provoking paper “Cognitive 
Foundations of the Impulse to Blame,” Lawrence Solan points 
to a surprising fact about the cognitive processes underlying 
attributions of blame.1  This surprising fact is that almost all of 
the processes that we use when trying to determine whether or 
not a person is blameworthy are also ones that we sometimes 
use even when we are not even considering the issue of blame.2  
Only a very small amount of processing is used exclusively 
when we are interested in questions of blame. 
This point can be made vivid with a simple example.  
Suppose that we witness a terrible accident and then assign an 
investigator to answer the question: “Why did this accident 
occur?” This investigator spends many months gathering 
evidence, formulating hypotheses, and considering arguments 
of various types.  Finally, he comes back with a definite 
answer.  And now suppose we tell him that we also want an 
answer to a second question, namely: “Was anyone to blame for 
this accident?” The investigator probably won’t have to spend 
another few months answering this new question.  It appears 
that almost all of the work has already been done; the 
investigator can simply take the results he has already 
obtained, do a little extra thinking, and come up with an 
answer. 
  
 † Princeton University.  I am grateful to Lawrence Solan and Gilbert 
Harman for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1 Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse of Blame, 68 
BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (2003). 
 2 Id. at 1004. 
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Solan provides support for this initial intuition through 
a sophisticated analysis of the cognitive processes that underlie 
attributions of blame.  Specifically, he shows that attributions 
of blame rely in a crucial way on judgments about mental states 
and about causal relations.3  He then shows that we would 
have made these very judgments anyway, even if we had not 
been concerned with questions of blame. 
Solan also offers a tentative hypothesis about why the 
cognitive processes that underlie attributions of blame overlap 
in this way with the cognitive processes used in other contexts.  
He suggests that perhaps human beings first began using these 
processes for some entirely separate purpose – e.g., because 
they served a useful role in predicting and explaining behavior 
– and that these processes then came to be used in blame 
attributions as well.4 
Solan is calling our attention to a very important 
phenomenon here, but I want to suggest that we ought to draw 
almost exactly the opposite conclusion about it from the one he 
has drawn.  The phenomenon is that nearly all of the cognitive 
processes that we use when assessing blame are also processes 
that we use when the question of blame does not even arise.  
Solan’s conclusion is that blame has had a relatively small 
impact on the capacities that underlie our cognitive processes.5  
I would draw the opposite conclusion: blame has had such a 
pervasive influence on our cognitive capacities that, even when 
we are not specifically interested in questions of blame, we 
often end up using cognitive processes that arose chiefly 
because of their role in making blame attributions. 
To bring out the contrast between these two conclusions, 
we can return to the example of the accident and the 
investigator.  Turning back to our example, once the 
investigator has finished figuring out why the accident 
occurred, he needs very little extra effort to figure out whether 
anyone is to blame.  Solan believes that almost all of the 
processing needed to assess blame might already have been 
needed simply to figure out why the event occurred, with only a 
little bit of extra processing at the end being required 
  
 3 Id. at 1009 (arguing that blame is triggered by a combination of the 
thought that an event occurred because of a person’s action and that the person should 
have known better). 
 4 Id. at 1004 (arguing that the impulse to blame is largely a ‘by-product’ of 
cognitive capacities we needed for other purposes); id. at 1012 (prescinding from any 
strong conclusions about the evolutionary basis of this outcome). 
 5 Id. at 1004, 1012. 
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exclusively for the purpose of assessing blame.6  By contrast, 
my conclusion is that the whole course of the investigator’s 
work – even when he was only being asked to determine why 
the accident occurred – was shaped by a concern with issues of 
blame.  The reason why so little additional processing is needed 
at the end is that, from the very beginning, his cognitive 
processes were shaped by a need to facilitate blame 
assessments. 
In arguing for this conclusion, I focus on the two kinds 
of judgments that Solan discusses in his paper – judgments 
about mental states and judgments about causal relations.7  
My claim is that the way in which people make these 
judgments, even when they are not specifically being 
confronted with questions about blame, is deeply influenced by 
a concern with blame attributions.8 
I. BLAME AND INTENTIONAL ACTION 
Attributions of blame depend in a fundamental way on 
judgments about the agent’s mental states.9  Thus, our decision 
as to whether or not the agent is blameworthy will often 
depend on our judgments about that agent’s goals, about the 
extent to which she foresaw certain outcomes, and about 
whether or not she performed the relevant behavior 
intentionally.  But as Solan points out, we make these kinds of 
judgments all the time – even when we are not at all concerned 
with questions of blame – and it therefore appears that we use 
relatively little of the processing for which we detect mental 
states exclusively for the purpose of making blame 
assessments.10 
A question then arises as to why we make these 
judgments in the way we do.  One possible view would be that 
our capacity to detect and classify people’s mental states arose, 
most fundamentally, from a need to predict and explain 
behavior.  Then, given that we already had this capacity in 
place, we began using it in blame assessments as well. 
  
 6 Id. at 1004. 
 7 Solan, supra note 1, at 1014-20. 
 8 Id. at 1018-20 (on mental states); id. at 1014-17 (on causal relations). 
 9 Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 566-68 (2000). 
 10 Solan, supra note 1, at 1003. 
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But there is another possibility.  Perhaps our capacity to 
detect and classify mental states has itself been shaped in 
certain ways by a need to assess blame.  In other words, it 
might turn out that our capacity to detect mental states was 
not shaped only by a need for predictions and explanations, but 
also (at least in certain respects) by a need to determine 
whether or not particular agents are blameworthy.11 
Take the distinction between behaviors that are 
performed “intentionally” and those that are performed 
“unintentionally.” One hypothesis would be that this 
distinction was shaped primarily by a need for prediction and 
explanation.  An alternative hypothesis would be that the 
distinction itself was shaped in part by a need for assessments 
of blame. 
The best way to decide between these two hypotheses 
would be to look in detail at the criteria that people use when 
they are trying to figure out whether a given behavior was 
performed intentionally or unintentionally.  Then we could see 
whether these criteria make better sense (a) as part of an 
attempt to predict and explain behavior or (b) as part of an 
attempt to assess blame.  I have addressed this issue in a 
number of recent publications;12 here we only have space for a 
highly compressed version of the argument. 
When we want to investigate the criteria that people 
use in determining whether or not a behavior was performed 
intentionally, one of the most helpful methods is to look at 
people’s intuitions regarding particular cases.  For example, let 
us consider the following story: 
A lieutenant was talking with a sergeant.  The lieutenant gave the 
order: ‘Send your squad to the top of Thompson Hill.’ 
The sergeant said: ‘But if I send my squad to the top of Thompson 
Hill, we’ll be moving the men directly into the enemy’s line of fire.  
Some of them will surely be killed!’ 
The lieutenant answered: ‘Look, I know that they’ll be in the line of 
fire, and I know that some of them will be killed.  But I don’t care at 
  
 11 For a more radical view, see Kristin Andrews, Folk Psychology is not a 
Predictive Device (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that our 
capacity to detect mental states was not shaped, even primarily, by need for 
prediction). 
 12 See, e.g., Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary 
Language, 63 ANALYSIS 190 (2003) [hereinafter Knobe, Intentional Action and Side 
Effects]; Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental 
Investigation, 16 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 309 (2003). 
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all about what happens to our soldiers.  All I care about is taking 
control of Thompson Hill.’ 
The squad was sent to the top of Thompson Hill.  As expected, the 
soldiers were moved into the enemy’s line of fire, and some of them 
were killed.13 
Confronted with this story, most people say that the 
lieutenant intentionally put the soldiers into the line of fire. 
But suppose that we make a small change in the story, 
changing the effect of the lieutenant’s behavior from something 
bad to something good.  The story then becomes: 
A lieutenant was talking with a sergeant.  The lieutenant gave the 
order: ‘Send your squad to the top of Thompson Hill.’ 
The sergeant said: ‘If I send my squad to the top of Thompson Hill, 
we’ll be taking the men out of the enemy’s line of fire.  They’ll be 
rescued!’ 
The lieutenant answered: ‘Look, I know that we’ll be taking them out 
of the line of fire, and I know that some of them would have been 
killed otherwise.  But I don’t care at all about what happens to our 
soldiers.  All I care about is taking control of Thompson Hill.’ 
The squad was sent to the top of Thompson Hill.  As expected, the 
soldiers were taken out of the enemy’s line of fire, and they thereby 
escaped getting killed.14 
Confronted with this revised version of the story, most 
subjects actually say that the lieutenant did not intentionally 
take the soldiers out of the line of fire.15  In fact, in a systematic 
experimental study, seventy-seven percent of subjects 
confronted with the first story said that the lieutenant 
intentionally put the soldiers into the line of fire, whereas only 
thirty percent of subjects confronted with the second story said 
that the lieutenant intentionally took the soldiers out of the 
line of fire.16 
Results like these suggest that people actually use 
judgments about the goodness or badness of the outcome as 
part of the criteria by means of which they determine whether 
or not a given behavior was performed intentionally.  But it 
seems unlikely that this aspect of the criteria serves primarily 
to facilitate some “scientific” purpose like the prediction and 
  
 13 Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects, supra note 12, at 192. 
 14 Id. at 192-93. 
 15 Id. at 193. 
 16 Id. 
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explanation of behavior.  The most well-supported hypothesis 
(at least at this point in the evolving research on the topic) 
would be that the very criteria by means of which we 
distinguish between intentional and unintentional behaviors 
have been influenced in some way by a concern with issues of 
blame. 
II. BLAME AND CAUSATION 
Attributions of blame are influenced, not only by 
judgments about the agent’s mental states, but also by 
judgments about causal relations.17  In general, we are unlikely 
to blame the agent for an outcome unless we believe that the 
agent caused that outcome.  But as Solan emphasizes, people 
quite often try to figure out whether or not a particular agent 
caused a particular outcome even when they are not wondering 
whether or not the agent is to blame.18  After all, a proper 
understanding of causal relations is often helpful in predicting 
and explaining events. 
This is quite a striking fact.  It seems odd that the very 
same relation – the relation of causation – should be used both 
for assessing blame and for generating predictions and 
explanations.  Why don’t we use two different relations here – 
one relation for assessing blame and another, slightly different 
relation for prediction and explanation?  Solan is careful not to 
engage in dogmatic evolutionary speculation.  However, he 
does suggest an interesting possibility.  Perhaps we already 
needed a capacity for detecting causal relations (because this 
capacity was useful in generating predictions and 
explanations), and we then came to use this capacity for 
assessing blame as well.19  But here again, there is another 
possibility.  Perhaps our capacity for detecting causal relations 
was itself shaped in a fundamental way by our concern with 
questions of blame. 
Note that we are not here entertaining the absurd 
hypothesis that people’s whole capacity for detecting causal 
relations arose out of a need to make assessments of blame.  
The idea is simply that certain aspects of this capacity – a 
capacity that presumably arose chiefly out of a need for 
prediction and explanation – may also have been shaped by a 
  
 17 Solan, supra note 1, at 1004. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 1004, 1012. 
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concern with attributions of blame.  To test this idea, we can 
look closely at the criteria by which people decide whether or 
not a given agent was the cause of a given outcome.  The 
question is whether all aspects of these criteria can be 
understood as part of an attempt to arrive at accurate 
predictions and explanations or whether some aspects only 
make sense as part of an attempt to assess blame. 
In this connection, let us consider the following story: 
Lauren works in the maintenance department of a large factory.  It 
is her responsibility to put oil in the K4 machine on the first day of 
each month.  If she doesn’t put in the oil, the machine will break 
down. 
On June first, Lauren forgot to put in the oil.  The machine broke 
down a few days later. 
Here it seems at least somewhat natural to say that 
Lauren caused the machine to break down.  After all, if she had 
simply fulfilled her responsibility and put in the oil, the 
breakdown would never have occurred. 
But now suppose that we add a new character to our 
story: 
Jane also works in the factory, but she does not work in the 
maintenance department.  She works in human resources, keeping 
track of all the details for the employee health insurance plan. 
Jane also knew how to put oil in the K4 machine.  But no one would 
have expected her to do so; it clearly wasn’t part of her job. 
Although Jane is quite similar to Lauren in certain 
respects, it seems quite wrong to say that Jane caused the 
accident.  Indeed, I conducted a simple experiment to show that 
people are more inclined to think that Lauren caused the 
accident than that Jane caused it.20 
But why do we distinguish between Lauren and Jane in 
this way? Neither of them put oil into the machine, and if 
  
 20 The subjects of this study were thirty-five people spending time in a 
Manhattan public park.  All of the subjects received the same questionnaire.  First, 
they read the vignette about Lauren, followed by the question: “Did Lauren cause the 
machine to break down?”  Then they were asked to read the vignette about Jane, 
followed by the question: “Did Jane cause the machine to break down?”  Each question 
was answered on a scale from zero (“no, she didn’t”) to six (“yes, she did”).  The mean 
rating for the Lauren vignette (M=.37) was significantly lower than that for the Jane 
vignette (M=3.34), t(35)=7.2, p<.001.  In other words, the degree to which people 
thought that Lauren was the cause was so much lower than the degree to which people 
thought that Jane was the cause that the difference is extremely unlikely to be due to 
chance alone. 
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either of them had put the oil in, the machine would not have 
broken down.  Why then do we say that Lauren caused the 
breakdown but Jane did not? In cases like this one, it seems 
hard to deny that our judgments about causal relations are 
being influenced in some way by our beliefs about the rightness 
and wrongness of particular behaviors.21  Presumably, we are 
influenced by the thought that Lauren was doing something 
wrong, that she really shouldn’t have neglected to put oil in the 
machine. 
What we see here, apparently, is a sense in which our 
capacity to detect causal relations is sensitive to moral 
considerations.  But it seems unlikely that this sensitivity is 
somehow furthering our aim of generating accurate predictions 
and explanations.  Thus, although these phenomena are not yet 
well-understood, it seems that the balance of evidence now 
points to the view that our capacity to detect causal relations 
has been shaped in certain respects by a concern with issues of 
blame. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Solan has directed our attention to an extremely 
important phenomenon: The surprising overlap between the 
cognitive capacities that we use when assessing blame and the 
capacities that we use for other, unrelated purposes.22  It 
appears that the vast majority of the capacities that we use 
when assessing blame are also used when we are simply trying 
to figure out why some given event has occurred.23 
Drawing upon this phenomenon, Solan is able to provide 
some enticing evidence for the conclusion that our concern with 
blame has had a relatively small impact on our underlying 
cognitive capacities.24  The essence of his argument lies in the 
claim that, since we already needed so many of the relevant 
capacities for other purposes, only a relatively small amount of 
additional structure would be necessary to make possible the 
ability that we now have to assess blame.25 
  
 21 For similar views, see generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, Causation: 
Omissions, 66 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 81 (2003); Sarah McGrath, Causation 
by Omission: A Dilemma, 123 PHIL. STUD. 125 (2005). 
 22 Solan, supra note 1, at 1004. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 1004, 1012. 
 25 Id. at 1004. 
2005] COGNITIVE PROCESSES, THE IMPULSE TO BLAME 937 
Although future research may vindicate Solan’s 
argument, it seems to me that the presently-available research 
actually points more strongly to the opposite conclusion.  It is 
true that most of the capacities that we use when assessing 
blame are also used when we are simply trying to figure out 
why an event occurred.  But we should not therefore assume 
that those capacities were already needed for some other 
purpose and then came to be used in blame assessment as well.  
Another possible conclusion – and one for which I have 
presented some tentative support – is that the capacities we 
normally use to explain and interpret events have been shaped 
in a fundamental way by our concern with blame. 
